安全速报自动同步 · 保留上游原文

【高危】simplesamlphp:权限控制风险(GHSA-q8r6-xj3f-wrrm)

S
KHack 安全情报
2026/7/3 发布 · 2 阅读

安全情报快照 · 风险级别:高危 · CVSS:7.1 · CVE-2026-49284 · GHSA-q8r6-xj3f-wrrm

先看结论

simplesamlphp存在权限控制风险,>= 2.5.0, <= 2.5.1 受影响,建议升级至 2.5.2。

影响范围

生态 组件 受影响版本 首个修复版本
composer simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp >= 2.5.0, <= 2.5.1 2.5.2
composer simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp <= 2.4.6 2.4.7

处置建议

优先将 simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp 升级至 2.5.2 或更高版本;升级前请结合业务依赖完成兼容性验证。

上游技术详情(原文)

Summary

SimpleSAMLphp's SAML SP ACS path does not enforce the IdP selected for an SP-initiated login. If a saved SP state contains ExpectedIssuer = IdP A, but the ACS receives a valid response from IdP B, the code logs a warning and continues processing instead of rejecting the response.

That behavior becomes security-relevant when combined with the response-processing rule that accepts an unsigned samlp:Response/@InResponseTo outside the signed assertion whenever the signed assertion's SubjectConfirmationData does not carry its own InResponseTo. A response issued by one trusted IdP can therefore be bound to SP state created for another IdP.

Impact

In a multi-IdP deployment, a lower-trust IdP can satisfy SP state created for a different expected IdP. This can bypass an SP flow that intentionally routes the user to a specific IdP, including deployments that set enable_unsolicited to false to prevent IdP-initiated logins.

The impact is highest when the SP trusts multiple IdPs with different assurance levels, tenant boundaries, or attribute namespaces, and application authorization depends on the selected/expected IdP. In those deployments this is an authentication/authorization bypass candidate. Impact strongly depends on whether an attacker can obtain a signed IdP-initiated assertion from a lower-trust trusted IdP and whether the downstream application maps identifiers globally.

来源与许可

本页自动同步 GitHub Advisory Database 的公开数据,并保留上游原文供核验;不宣称原创分析。数据许可:CC-BY-4.0。

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