【严重】fission 安全更新（GHSA-m63v-2g9w-2w6v）

安全情报快照 · 风险级别：严重 · CVSS：9.9 · CVE-2026-50566 · GHSA-m63v-2g9w-2w6v

先看结论

fission存在安全风险，<= 1.23.0 受影响，建议升级至 1.24.0。

影响范围

生态	组件	受影响版本	首个修复版本
go	`github.com/fission/fission`	<= 1.23.0	1.24.0

处置建议

优先将 github.com/fission/fission 升级至 1.24.0 或更高版本；升级前请结合业务依赖完成兼容性验证。

上游技术详情（原文）

Summary

A follow-up bypass of the round-4 PodSpec hardening (GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7, GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7, GHSA-v455-mv2v-5g92). Those advisories validate and sanitize the PodSpec (spec.runtime.podSpec / spec.builder.podSpec /
function.spec.podSpec), but the Environment CRD also exposes spec.runtime.container and spec.builder.container — a standalone Container merged into the runtime/builder pod whose SecurityContext bypassed both layers.

Details

Admission-layer gap. Environment.Validate() calls ValidatePodSpecSafety() on Runtime.PodSpec and Builder.PodSpec only. That function takes a *PodSpec, so it never inspects the standalone Runtime.Container.SecurityContext
or Builder.Container.SecurityContext.

Merge-layer gap. sanitizeContainerSecurityContext() ran only inside MergePodSpec(). The container field is merged via MergeContainer(), which did not sanitize. With only Runtime.Container set and Runtime.PodSpec nil,
MergePodSpec is never invoked, so the sanitizer never ran.

Affected merge sites: poolmgr (gp_deployment.go), newdeploy (newdeploy.go), and buildermgr (envwatcher.go).

Proof of concept

apiVersion: fission.io/v1
kind: Environment
metadata:
  name: priv-escape-test
  namespace: default
spec:
  version: 3
  runtime:
    image: "ghcr.io/fission/python-env:latest"
    container:
      name: priv-escape-test
      securityContext:
        privileged: true
  poolsize: 1

The admission webhook accepts this Environment and the resulting pool pod runs with privileged: true. Equivalent bypasses: allowPrivilegeEscalation: true, capabilities.add: ["SYS_ADMIN"], capabilities.add: ["NET_ADMIN","SYS_PTRACE"]. The same attack applies to Builder.Container.

Impact

A tenant with environments.fission.io create/update RBAC can run privileged / allowPrivilegeEscalation / dangerous-capability containers in the Fission function or builder namespace, scheduled under the executor's high-privilege
service account — enabling container-sandbox escape, host filesystem and network access, and potential node- and cluster-level compromise. Identical blast radius to GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7.

Fix

Fixed in #3406 and released in v1.24.0.

Admission layer (primary defence): a new ValidateContainerSafety in pkg/apis/core/v1/podspec_safety.go applies the per-container SecurityContext denylist (privileged, allowPrivilegeEscalation, dangerous capabilities) to a
standalone container, and is called from Environment.Validate() for Runtime.Container and Builder.Container.
Merge layer (defence in depth): sanitizeContainerSecurityContext() is now invoked inside MergeContainer() itself, covering all three executor/builder call sites.

Workarounds

Restrict Environment create/update RBAC to trusted administrators.
Deploy a Kyverno / OPA Gatekeeper policy rejecting dangerous Container SecurityContext on Environment CRDs.
Label the function/builder namespaces with pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted.

References

GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7, GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7, GHSA-v455-mv2v-5g92 — the round-4 PodSpec fixes this advisory bypasses (#3391, e484df84).

来源与许可

本页自动同步 GitHub Advisory Database 的公开数据，并保留上游原文供核验；不宣称原创分析。数据许可：CC-BY-4.0。