安全速报自动同步 · 保留上游原文

【高危】v2:服务端请求伪造风险(GHSA-jxpm-75mh-9fp7)

S
KHack 安全情报
2026/7/2 发布 · 2 阅读

安全情报快照 · 风险级别:高危 · CVSS:7.5 · CVE-2026-50151 · GHSA-jxpm-75mh-9fp7

先看结论

v2存在服务端请求伪造风险,< 2.6.1 受影响,建议升级至 2.6.1。

影响范围

生态 组件 受影响版本 首个修复版本
go oras.land/oras-go/v2 < 2.6.1 2.6.1

处置建议

优先将 oras.land/oras-go/v2 升级至 2.6.1 或更高版本;升级前请结合业务依赖完成兼容性验证。

上游技术详情(原文)

Summary

oras-go follows a registry-controlled Location header during the monolithic blob upload flow and reuses the Authorization header from the initial POST request for the subsequent PUT request. If a malicious registry returns a cross-host Location, oras-go can send the caller's credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint.

Affected Versions

tested: v2.6.0 (commit 03243809936cce826494b5506f724c6dc11115b1, as-of 2026-01-24)
range: unknown; likely affects earlier v2.x releases that include the same upload flow

Impact

Credential leak to an attacker-controlled endpoint and client-side ssrf to a cross-host target.

Affected Component

  • registry/remote/repository.go:878-916 (blobStore.completePushAfterInitialPost)

Reproduction

Attachments include poc.zip with a local-only harness (no real registry required). It runs a fake registry server that returns a cross-host Location and a second server that records whether it received Authorization.

unzip -q -o poc.zip -d /tmp/poc
cd /tmp/poc/poc-F-ORAS-LOCATION-UPLOAD-001
make canonical
make control
  • validate Location before uploading (scheme + hostname + effective port) against the original request, or require an explicit opt-in allowlist for cross-host upload urls
  • never forward Authorization when the upload target changes host or scheme

references

来源与许可

本页自动同步 GitHub Advisory Database 的公开数据,并保留上游原文供核验;不宣称原创分析。数据许可:CC-BY-4.0。

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