【中危】v2 安全更新（GHSA-5wg6-jmq2-53pw）

安全情报快照 · 风险级别：中危 · CVSS：5.8 · CVE-2026-55438 · GHSA-5wg6-jmq2-53pw

先看结论

v2存在安全风险，>= 2.34.0, < 2.34.2 受影响，建议升级至 2.34.2。

影响范围

生态	组件	受影响版本	首个修复版本
go	`github.com/coder/coder/v2`	>= 2.34.0, < 2.34.2	2.34.2
go	`github.com/coder/coder/v2`	>= 2.33.0, < 2.33.8	2.33.8
go	`github.com/coder/coder/v2`	>= 2.30.0, < 2.32.7	2.32.7
go	`github.com/coder/coder/v2`	< 2.29.17	2.29.17

处置建议

优先将 github.com/coder/coder/v2 升级至 2.34.2 或更高版本；升级前请结合业务依赖完成兼容性验证。

上游技术详情（原文）

Summary

Coder's subdomain-based workspace app proxy allowed the same-owner CORS check to be bypassed. When a workspace-name subdomain segment parsed as a UUID, the workspace was resolved by ID without confirming the URL's username matched the real owner, while the CORS middleware trusted the unverified username in the hostname.

Note: Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname) enabled and a victim who visits the attacker's crafted app URL while authenticated.

Impact

An authenticated user could craft a subdomain encoding their own workspace UUID and a victim's username. If the victim visited the attacker's URL, the attacker's JavaScript could issue credentialed cross-origin fetch() requests to the victim's workspace apps and read the responses, exfiltrating data accessible through those apps.

Patches

The fix validates the subdomain username against the resolved workspace's actual owner and bases the same-owner CORS decision on the authoritative owner identity.

The fix was backported to all supported release lines:

Release line	Patched version
2.34	v2.34.2
2.33	v2.33.8
2.32	v2.32.7
2.29 (ESR)	v2.29.17

Workarounds

None.

Resources

Fix: #26086, #26085

Credits

Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22434) for independently disclosing this issue!

来源与许可

本页自动同步 GitHub Advisory Database 的公开数据，并保留上游原文供核验；不宣称原创分析。数据许可：CC-BY-4.0。