【高危】jxl-grid：远程代码执行风险（GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5）

安全情报快照 · 风险级别：高危 · CVSS：7.3 · CVE-2026-52834 · GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5

先看结论

jxl-grid存在远程代码执行风险，<= 0.6.1 受影响，建议升级至 0.6.2。

影响范围

生态	组件	受影响版本	首个修复版本
rust	`jxl-grid`	<= 0.6.1	0.6.2

处置建议

优先将 jxl-grid 升级至 0.6.2 或更高版本；升级前请结合业务依赖完成兼容性验证。

上游技术详情（原文）

Summary

On 32-bit platforms, decoding a crafted image may lead to out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in length calculation.

Details & PoC

The test listed below fail under miri with command cargo +nightly miri test --release -p jxl-grid

Or you can use Address Sanitizer, which ignores Rust-specific UB like aliasing but still flags out-of-bounds accesses:

RUSTFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=address cargo +nightly test -Zbuild-std -p jxl-grid --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu

The following tests should be appended to crates/jxl-grid/src/test/subgrids.rs:

mod miri_ub {
    use super::*;

    // `AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker` computes `width * height` unchecked. In release, overflow
    // can create a tiny backing buffer for huge logical dimensions.
    #[test]
    fn aligned_grid_dimension_product_overflows() {
        let width = usize::MAX / 2 + 1;
        let mut grid = AlignedGrid::<u8>::with_alloc_tracker(width, 2, None).unwrap();
        let mut subgrid = grid.as_subgrid_mut();
        *subgrid.get_mut(0, 1) = 1;
        std::hint::black_box(grid);
    }
}

This issue can be reachable through decoding a crafted image in two ways:

Huge actual frame
A frame such as 65536 x 65536 passes the current frame area limit (2^32 <= 2^40) but overflows usize element count on 32-bit. Rendering then allocates too-small AlignedGrids in modular/VarDCT/filter paths and later writes through mutable subgrids.
Huge canvas plus tiny cropped frame
This is the more practical “small payload, huge logical output” case. A bitstream-controlled frame crop can be tiny, but if the canvas/default requested region is huge, composition can allocate an output grid sized to the canvas/ROI at crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs. That is bitstream frame cropping, not API crop. With a 32-bit target and a full requested image region whose area overflows, this can happen through ordinary render_frame().

Impact

On 32-bit platforms this can cause out-of-bounds writes with attacker-controlled data when decoding a crafted JPEG XL image. This could allow arbitrary code execution.

来源与许可

本页自动同步 GitHub Advisory Database 的公开数据，并保留上游原文供核验；不宣称原创分析。数据许可：CC-BY-4.0。